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Earlier this year, Bill C-35 amended 
the Criminal Code  to better protect 
law enforcement, military and 
service animals. This Act, cited 
as the Justice for Animals in 
Service Act, honoured Quanto, 
a police dog  that was stabbed to 
death while helping  apprehend a fleeing 
suspect. 
This law creates s. 445.01, which makes it a hybrid 
offence to wilfully and without lawful excuse kill, 
maim, wound, poison or injure:
• a law enforcement animal while it is aiding  a
law enforcement officer in carrying  out that
officer’s duties;
• a military  animal while it is aiding  a member of
the Canadian Forces in carrying  out that
member’s duties; or
• a service animal while  it is assisting  a person
with a disability.
The new law also defines “law enforcement animal”, 
“law enforcement officer”, “military animal” and 
“service animal”.
“law enforcement animal” means a  dog  or horse 
that is trained to aid a law enforcement officer in 
carrying out that officer’s duties.
“law enforcement officer” means a police officer, a 
police constable  or any person referred to in para. 
(b), (c.1), (d), (d.1), (e) or (g)  of the definition “peace 
officer” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. 
This includes:
• Correctional Service of Canada officers
• Police officers
• Canada Border Services officers
• Immigration officers
• Fisheries officers
• Canadian Forces officers.
“military  animal” means an animal that is trained to 
aid a member of the Canadian Forces in carrying  out 
that member’s duties.
“service animal” means an animal that is required 
by a person with a  disability for assistance and is 
certified, in writing, as having  been trained by a 
professional service animal institution to assist a 
person with a disability.
Punishment
If a  person is convicted of an offence under this 
provision by indictment, the maximum term of 
imprisonment is five (5)  years. A minimum 
mandatory sentence of six  (6)  months attaches if an 
accused kills a law enforcement animal in the 
commission of an offence. If a charge proceeds 
summarily, the  maximum punishment is a fine of 
$10,000 and/or 18 months in prison. 
Any sentence imposed for a conviction under this 
new offence must also be served consecutively with 
any other punishment imposed for an offence arising 
out of the  same event or series of events. (s. 445.01
(3)).
As well, s. 718.03 of the Criminal Code  has been 
added which requires a court to give primary 
consideration to the objectives of denunciation and 
deterrence upon sentencing  for an offence under s. 
445.01(1).
s. 445.01 (1) Every one commits an
offence who, wilfully and without 
lawful excuse, kills, maims, wounds, 
poisons or injures a law enforcement 
animal while it is aiding a law enforcement 
officer in carrying out that officer’s duties, a 
military animal while it is aiding a member of the 
Canadian Forces in carrying out that member’s 
duties or a service animal.
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Upcoming Courses
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Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
????	 ??????	 ???????
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
!
November 17, 2015
9 am - 3 pm
JIBC Theatre
715 McBride Blvd.
New Westminster, BC
see page 4
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The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The 5 choices: the path to extraordinary 
productivity.
Kory Kogon, Adam Merrill, Leena Rinne.
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2015.
HD 69 T54 K64 2015
Breakthroughs in  decision science and risk 
analysis.
edited by Louis Anthony Cox, Jr.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015.
HD 61 B74 2015
Experiential  learning:  a handbook for education, 
training and coaching.
Colin Beard, John P. Wilson.
London, UK: Kogan Page Limited, 2013.
LB 1060 B43 2013
Gender, sex and the law in Canada.
edited by Johanne Elizabeth O'Hanlon.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2015.
KE 4399 G46 2015
Hungry!: fuelling your best game.
Ryan Walter.
Langley, BC: Heads-up Communications Corp., 
2014.
BF 503 W34 2014
Learn or die:  using  science to build a leading-
edge learning organization.
Edward D. Hess.
New York, NY: Columbia University  School 
Publishing, 2014.
HD 58.82 H365 2014
The learning  challenge: dealing  with technology, 
innovation and change in learning  and 
development.
Nigel Paine.
Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2014.
HD 58.82 P35 2014
The power of thanks: how social recognition 
empowers employees and creates a best place to 
work.
Eric Mosley and Derek Irvine.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2014.
HF 5549.5 M63 M675 2014
Research strategies:  finding your way through the 
information fog.
William Badke.
Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, LLC, 2014.
Z 710 B23 2014
The resiliency revolution: your stress solution for 
life, 60 seconds at a time.
Jenny C. Evans.
Minneapolis, MN: Wise Ink Creative Pub., 2015.
BF 575 S75 E93 2015
Tell  me a story [videorecording]:  a powerful way to 
inspire action.
created by John A. Jenson and CRM Learning.
Carlsbad, CA: CRM Learning, c2013.
1 videodisc (18 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. + 1 CD-ROM. 
1 leader's guide, 5 participant workbooks.
Stories can capture  peoples' hearts and minds; using 
them makes communication both memorable and 
meaningful. In this program, John Jenson illustrates 
how leaders can use storytelling  to impact such 
things as: creating  a shared vision of the future, kick-
starting  new projects, highlighting  lessons learned, 
and reinforcing the organization's brand.
HD 30.3 T455 2013 D2047
Using  emotional intelligence at work:  17 tried 
and tested activities for understanding  the 
practical application of emotional intelligence.
Mike Bagshaw.
Port Perry, ON: Owen-Stewart Performance 
Resources Inc., 2008.
BF 576.3 B34 2008
Instructor:  Mike  Novakowski  (M.O.M.,  M.A.,  L.L.M.)  is  a  serving  police  officer  presently  holding  the  rank  of  Staff  Sergeant.  
He  has  a  Master  of  Arts  degree  in  Leadership  and  Training  and  a  Master  of  Laws  degree  from  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School  
specializing  in  Criminal  Law  and  Procedure.  He  is  a  former  legal  studies  instructor  at  the  JIBC  Police  Academy,  has  taught  
several  advanced  police  training  courses  and  is  currently  a  sessional  instructor  at  UFV  in  the  School  of  Criminology  and  
Criminal  Justice.  Mike  is  the  author  and  editor  of  “In  Service:  10-­‐8”,  a  peer  read  newsletter  devoted  to  operational  police  
officers  in  Canada,  and  the  case  law  editor  for  Blue  Line  magazine  with  its  national  readership  of  55,000.  Mike’s  law  
degree,  experience  as  a  police  officer  and  passion  for  teaching  gives  him  a  unique  perspective  to  present  an  exciting  
seminar  that  is  a  must  see  for  all  police  officers.  
Date:    
November  17,  2015  
9:00  am  –  3:00  pm  
Location:  
JIBC  Theatre  
715  McBride  Boulevard  
New  Westminster,  BC  
How  to  Register:  
Email:  Karen  Albrecht  
kalbrecht@jibc.ca  
or  contact  your  Training  
Section  
Registration  Fee:  
$89  (plus  GST)  
Restricted  to  law  
enforcement  officers.  
For  more  information:  
Email:  Sgt.  Kelly  Joiner  
kjoiner@jibc.ca    
Police  departments  and  individual  officers  are  subject  to  intense  scrutiny.  The  
very  nature  of  police  work  lends  itself  to  complaints,  lawsuits,  media  attention  
and  courtroom  critique  of  police  investigations.  Law  enforcement  officers  must  
understand  the  ever-­‐changing  legal  landscape  under  which  they  carry  out  their  
duties  on  a  daily  basis.  A  failure  to  appreciate  and  correctly  apply  the  law  can  
lead  to  serious  consequences,  including  criminal  sanctions  against  individual  
officers  and  the  exclusion  of  evidence.  Criminals  can  walk  free,  victims  may  be  
discouraged  and  officers  become  frustrated  by  the  process.  This  seminar  will  
provide  officers  with  a  solid  foundation  in  the  principles  of  police  powers.  
?   Significant  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  judgments.  
?   Types  of  police/citizen  encounters.  
?   Continuum  of  suspicion.  
?   Using  source  information.  
?   Vehicle  stops.  
?   Investigative  detention.  
?   Pat  downs  &  frisks.  
?   Arrest  &  search.  
?   Right  to  counsel.  
?   K-­‐9  sniffs.  
?   Trash  pulls.  
?   Safety  searches.  
?   Entrapment.  
?   and  much  more.  
Topics  include:  
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Consecutive Sentences
Bill C-35 also changed the way sentences are to be 
imposed for assaults committed against law 
enforcement officers under ss. 279(1), 270.01 and 
270.02. The Criminal Code now requires such 
sentences to be consecutive to any sentences 
imposed out of the same event or series of events: 
Existing  s. 718.02 provides that, when a sentence is 
imposed for serious offences against a  peace officer 
(or intimidation of a justice system participant), the 
court shall give primary consideration to the 
objectives of denunciation and deterrence. 
According  to Statistics Canada, there were 9,450 
assaults against peace officers reported in 2014. 
This was 376 fewer reported assaults than 2013. 
As for assaults overall, the numbers were as follows:
• Assault - Level 1 
• 153,352
• Assault - Level 2 (weapon or bodliy harm)
• 44,788
• Assault - Level 3 (aggravated)
• 3,232
source: Statistics Canada, Police Reported Crime Statistics in Canada, 
2014, 85-002-X (released July 22, 2015) 
s. 270.03 A sentence imposed on a 
person for an offence under 
subsection 270(1) or 270.01(1) or 
section 270.02 committed against a law 
enforcement officer, as defined in subsection 
445.01(4), shall be served consecutively to any 
other punishment imposed on the person for an 
offence arising out of the same event or series of 
events.
BY THE BOOK:
????????	 ???????	 ?????	 ????????? Criminal Code
Assaulting a peace officer
s. 270. (1) Every one commits an offence who
(a)  assaults a public officer or peace officer 
engaged in the execution of his duty or a 
person acting in aid of such an officer;
(b)  assaults a person with intent to resist or prevent the 
lawful arrest or detention of himself or another person; or
(c) assaults a person
(i)  who is engaged in the lawful execution of a process 
against lands or goods or in making a lawful distress or 
seizure, or
(ii)  with intent to rescue anything taken under lawful 
process, distress or seizure.
Punishment
(2) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) 
is guilty of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding five years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
Assaulting peace officer with weapon or causing bodily harm
s. 270.01  (1)  Everyone commits an offence who, in 
committing an assault referred to in section 270,
(a)  carries, uses or threatens to use a weapon or an 
imitation of one; or
(b) causes bodily harm to the complainant.
Punishment
(2) Everyone who commits an offence under subsection (1) 
is guilty of
(a)  an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a 
term of not more than 10 years; or
(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable 
to imprisonment for a term of not more than 18 months.
Aggravated assault of peace officer
s. 270.02 Everyone who, in committing an assault referred 
to in section 270, wounds, maims, disfigures or endangers 
the life of the complainant is guilty of an indictable offence 
and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 
years.
Did you know?
s. 718.02 When a court imposes a sentence for an 
offence under subsection 270(1), section 270.01 
or 270.02 or paragraph 423.1(1)(b), the court 
shall give primary consideration to the objectives 
of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct 
that forms the basis of the offence.
NE
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R. v. Gardner, 2015 NLCA 44
The police arrested the accused after 
responding  to a complaint from a 
woman alleging  he had assaulted her 
and left her house after drinking. The 
accused was found driving  slowly on 
a road. He exhibited signs of impairment and 
provided two breath samples over the legal limit 
(210 mg% and 200 mg%). In a cautioned statement 
he admitted that he was impaired,  but told police 
he drove out of fear. He said he did not knock on 
someone’s door for help instead of driving  his car 
because  he wanted to go to the home of someone 
he knew. As well, he stated he did not approach the 
police, who were nearby, because he had “gotten 
himself out of the situation” by then but still wanted 
to protect his car from damage. He was charged 
with impaired driving and over 80mg%.
Newfoundland & Labrador Provincial Court
The accused again admitted he was 
impaired but argued he drove out of 
necessity. He feared for his life  and the 
safety of his vehicle after being  ejected 
from the complainant’s home by  another man. He 
claimed the man dragged him from the house on his 
back and left him lying outside.
The judge ruled that the excuse of necessity had not 
been made out. Even if his life  was in imminent 
peril, there  were other legal alternatives available to 
the accused. He could have sought shelter in nearby 
houses. The judge also found the accused had 
inflicted more harm in driving  while intoxicated than 
the harm he claimed he was seeking  to avoid. The 
accused was convicted, fined $1,500 and a 14-
month driving prohibition was imposed. 
Newfoundland & Labrador Supreme Court
An appeal judge agreed with the trial 
judge that the defence of necessity was 
inapplicable in the circumstances as 
described by the accused. His appeal was 
dismissed.  
Newfoundland & Labrador Court of Appeal
The accused then sought further 
leave to appeal asking  that his 
convictions be set aside. Justice 
Barry, writing  the Court of Appeal 
judgment, refused to grant an appeal. In his view, 
there  was no reasonable possibility  that an appeal 
would succeed because the law was well settled. 
Necessity Excuse (Defence) 
For the excuse of necessity to succeed, three 
elements must be satisfied:
1. the accused must be in imminent peril.
2. the accused must have no reasonable legal 
alternative to disobeying the law.
3. there  must be proportionality between the 
harm inflicted and the harm avoided.
Justice Barry then went on to discuss each of these 
requirements and how they related to the accused’s 
situation. 
Imminent Peril:  The accused was not in imminent 
peril once the man he claimed he feared had 
returned to the home:
If [the accused] believed his life was still at risk, 
as he stated, that belief was an unreasonable 
one. ...
BY THE BOOK:
?????????	 ?????	 ????????? Criminal Code
s. 253(1) Every one commits an offence who 
operates a motor vehicle ... or has the care or 
control of a motor vehicle, ... whether it is in 
motion or not,
(a)  while the person’s ability to operate the 
vehicle, vessel, aircraft or railway equipment is impaired by 
alcohol or a drug; or
(b)  having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that the 
concentration in the person’s blood exceeds eighty 
milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.
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[The accused], by his own admission, believed 
he had gotten himself out of the situation of 
danger before driving. As for [the accused’s] 
argument that he needed to move his car to 
protect it from possible damage, assuming, but 
not deciding, that avoiding  imminent property 
damage may in certain circumstances meet the 
test of necessity, in the present case damage to 
his car was not “on the verge of transpiring and 
virtually certain to occur” but merely a 
speculative risk which did not provide a valid 
excuse for driving. [paras. 14-15]
No reasonable  legal  alternative:  This element was 
not met. The accused could have contacted the 
nearby police or walked to nearby houses. 
Proportionality: “[B]y driving  while  impaired, [the 
accused] exposed the  public to a much greater risk 
of harm than he himself was experiencing  or sought 
to avoid,” said Justice Barry. “This is not permissible.  
The harm inflicted must not be out of proportion to 
the peril to be avoided.”
As for applying  these requirements to this case, the 
Appeal Court stated:
The factors of imminent peril and no reasonable 
legal alternative are evaluated in accordance 
with a modified objective standard.  It is not 
enough for [the accused] to establish he 
believed he was in imminent peril with no 
reasonable legal way out.  That belief must be 
one that is reasonable in the circumstances.  In 
[the accused’s] case it was not reasonable. 
[reference omited, para. 17]
The lower courts did not err in finding  the Crown 
had proven there  was no imminent peril and 
reasonable legal alternatives existed. Leave to appeal 
was refused.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Want to walk fast, walk alone.
Want to walk far, walk together”-
African Proverb
???????	 ??????	 ???????	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R. v. Wu, 2015 ONCA 667 
After arresting  three men, including 
Calvin Jiang, in the parking  lot of a 
plaza, the police found a half 
k i log ram o f f r e sh ly -p repared 
methamphetamine in a blue Acura. 
The men were charged with possession of a 
controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking 
and their cell phones were seized. Some 18  days 
later a  detective was told about a  tip from a 
confidential informer. The informer had provided 
information about a man, “believed to be Wu”, who 
was involved in the production and trafficking  of 
methamphetamine. Although the police took steps to 
confirm the accuracy of this information, there were 
problems with the reliability  of the informer 
including  the fact that s/he was untested and had a 
criminal record.  The informer also provided a 
telephone number for Wu. This number was 
registered to a Tommy Wu. Police records, 
information from the Ministry of Transportation and 
information from an intelligence officer at the 
Canada Border Services Agency supported both the 
telephone number provided by the confidential 
informer and the address to which the number was 
connected.This telephone number was also found in 
Jiang’s cellphone which was seized during  the earlier 
arrest. 
The police then conducted surveillance in July, 
August, and early September. Many observations 
were made on several dates over these months. As a 
consequence of the information received and the 
surveillance observations, the detective concluded 
that there was reason to believe that the accused 
was in possession of controlled substances and other 
evidence related to the production of it. He ordered 
the accused’s arrest.
The police  arrested the accused and searched the 
car he was driving  incident to the arrest. Police 
found evidence of methamphetamine possession 
and production, including  105 grams of MDMA 
(ecstasy), a  white plastic bag  containing  jars, plastic 
juice containers, and a  plastic tube-like cup  with 
straws attached to the tops, keys with a security fob, 
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a satchel containing  about $2,000 in cash and 
identification.  The detective  then prepared an 
Information to Obtain (ITO)  search warrants 
regarding  two condominium units connected to the 
accused. The  ITO contained information relating  to 
the entire investigation including  the detective’s own 
observations, observations reported by other officers, 
information from the confidential informer and the 
evidence obtained from the search incident to the 
accused’s arrest.  The warrants were issued and the 
police searched the two units finding  extensive 
evidence of methamphetamine production, 
including  a tray of drying  brown powder, a jug  of 
methyl hydrate, drying  MDMA, and bags of drugs or 
cutting  agents. The accused was charged with 
production of methamphetamine, possession of 
methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, 
production of ecstasy, possession of ecstasy for the 
purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of 
crime.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Although the judge believed the officer 
had the subjective belief that he had 
grounds to arrest the accused, she 
concluded those grounds were not 
objectively reasonable. Since the evidence did not 
support a search for safety concerns or exigent 
circumstances, the arrest and the search incident to 
arrest breached ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter. All 
reference to the evidence found in the course of the 
accused’s arrest was excised from the ITO. In 
considering  the balance of the information in the 
ITO, the judge found it could no longer support the 
warrants. The evidence found in both condominium 
searches was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
Once the  drug  evidence was excluded, the Crown 
advised that no further evidence would be called 
and the charges were dismissed by the judge. 
 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the acquittals 
arguing  the trial judge erred in her 
assessment o f whether the 
detective had reasonable grounds 
to arrest the accused. In the Crown’s view, the 
evidence obtained in the search incident to the 
accused’s arrest should not have been excised from 
the ITO. The accused, on the other hand, submitted 
that the  trial judge correctly decided that the police 
breached ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter when they 
arrested and searched him incident to his arrest. 
Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
Justice Epstein, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, described the test for reasonable grounds 
as follows:
To establish reasonable and probable grounds 
for arrest, a police officer must subjectively 
believe that a person has committed or is about 
to commit an indictable offence, and the police 
officer must be able to justify that belief on an 
objective basis, meaning that a reasonable 
person placed in the position of the police must 
be able to conclude that there were reasonable 
and probable grounds. The police need not 
demonstrate anything more than reasonable and 
probable grounds.  Specifically, the police need 
not establish a prima facie case for conviction. 
[reference omitted, para. 49]
Importantly, this analysis involves examining  the 
belief that grounds for arrest existed through the lens 
of a reasonable person placed in the position of the 
police officer. This includes a  consideration of the 
officer’s training  and experience. In concluding  that 
the trial judge erred in her analysis of whether there 
was reasonable grounds to arrest the accused, Justice 
Epstein stated:
“To establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, a police officer must 
subjectively believe that a person has committed or is about to commit an indictable 
offence, and the police officer must be able to justify that belief on an objective basis, 
meaning that a reasonable person placed in the position of the police must be able to 
conclude that there were reasonable and probable grounds.”
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The primary problem with the trial judge’s 
analysis lies in her failure to ... assess the 
probative value of the evidence “through the 
lens of a reasonable person ‘standing in the 
shoes of the police officer’”.   
Here, the lens through which the trial judge was 
legally obligated to evaluate the probative value 
of the evidence available to the police was 
particularly powerful.
As the trial judge noted, the evidence called on 
the voir dire established that [the detective] was 
a police officer with impressive training and 
considerable experience in investigating drug-
related criminal activity.  [The detective’s] 
evidence was to the effect that his conclusion 
that grounds existed to arrest [the accused] was 
based on his view of all of the available 
evidence as interpreted by him against the 
background of his training and experience.
[The detective] made it clear that his conclusion 
that there were grounds to arrest [the accused] 
was not the result of a snap judgment. Rather, it 
was a conclusion reached based on evidence 
gathered over the course of an investigation that 
started with a tip and evidence linking [the 
accused] to Jiang and that appeared increasingly 
fruitful as observations were made during two 
months of surveillance.
As p rev ious ly no ted , t he t r i a l j udge 
acknowledged [the detective’s] training and 
experience in her ruling.  However, there is no 
indication that she did what she was required to 
do – assess whether a case for reasonable 
grounds had been made out by examining  the 
totality of the available information through the 
lens of a reasonable person standing in [the 
detective's] shoes. In failing to do so, I conclude 
that the trial judge’s assessment of the objective 
reasonableness of [the detective’s] belief that 
reasonable grounds existed to arrest [the 
accused] was tainted by legal error. [paras. 
53-58]
In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
detective did have reasonable grounds. The informer 
information (although weak) and the  information 
supporting  a connection between the accused and 
Jiang  (including  that relating  to the telephone 
number, and the  surveillance evidence), when 
interpreted by the detective through his experience 
and training, provided objective support for his 
subjective belief that reasonable and probable 
grounds existed for the arrest. 
The trial judge erred in excising  from the ITO the 
evidence obtained from the search incidental to the 
accused’s arrest. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, 
the acquittals were set aside and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case avaialable at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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R. v. Hunter, 2015 BCCA 428
A police officer, with five years’ 
experience, prepared an Information 
to Obtain a search warrant (ITO). He 
included information from a number 
of sources. This included information 
from other police officers and from three 
confidential informers. 
• Informer 1 provided specific information that the 
accused sold cocaine and received his drugs from 
an individual named Johnny. In the officer’s view, 
based on his experience and knowledge of the 
drug  trade in the area, the person referred to by 
the first informant as “Johnny” was Windsor 
Nguyen, a member of the Red Scorpions. 
• Informer 2 said that Windsor Nguyen had a safe 
house at 155 Strickland Street, Nanaimo, and that 
the accused sold drugs for Windsor Nguyen, lived 
at the address on Strickland Street and used taxis 
to run drugs. This information, however, was 
undated.
• Informer 3  provided specific information that the 
accused was actively  selling  ounces of cocaine 
and heroin, that he trafficked cocaine  and heroin 
for Windsor Nguyen and that Windsor Nguyen 
used the street name “Johnny”.
All three informers were identified as reliable and as 
individuals who had provided information that had 
resulted in other arrests and seizures. 
The police then conducted surveillance over four 
days and made the following observations:
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• By way of taxi, the accused briefly visited the 
residence of a known drug trafficker;
• The accused met a  known member of the Red 
Scorpions;
• A brief visit by the accused and the Red Scorpions 
member to the residence of another known drug 
trafficker;
• A brief visit to the accused’s home by a  person, 
later identified as Philip Pham, who was seen to 
enter and leave the Strickland Street house with a 
small black duffel bag. When he departed with 
the bag, he took a taxi directly to the Departure 
Bay ferry terminal where he was arrested at about 
6:30 p.m. A search of the duffel bag  disclosed that 
he was carrying  in excess of $50,000 cash in 
wrapped and labelled bundles.
Pending  the application for a search warrant, the 
police went to the accused’s address on Strickland 
Street. Surveillance  indicated that two people were 
in the residence but it was not known whether the 
accused was one of them. The police conducted a 
warrantless sweep  search to determine if the  home 
was in fact occupied and to secure it. When the 
search warrant was obtained and executed, the 
police found 400 grams of cocaine, 1.7 kgs. of 
crack, 700 grams of heroin and 800 grams of 
methamphetamine in a safe  in a  bedroom closet. 
The accused was charged with three  counts of 
possessing  a controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge found the accused’s arrest 
lawful. The police relied upon the 
confidential source information, the 
surveillance observations and the 
discovery of the cash in the duffel bag  following  the 
arrest of Pham at the Departure Bay ferry terminal. 
The officer had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused, which was objectively justifiable in the 
circumstances. He reasonably believed that a  drug 
delivery or drug  reload had occurred when Pham 
was at the Strickland Street residence. As for the 
warrantless search, the judge found there were 
grounds to obtain a search warrant under s. 11(1)  of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). 
There were significant specific  details in the informer 
tips relating  to the nature of the drugs, the quantity, 
the type of the drugs, and how the drugs were 
distributed or delivered. This information was cross-
corroborated by comparison of tip‑to‑tip information 
and with the information available to police, 
including  the surveillance observations that 
corroborated both innocent details and certain 
aspects of the criminality alleged by the informer.
As for exigent circumstances, the judge found that 
exigent circumstances existed so as to justify a 
warrantless entry under s. 11(7) under the CDSA to 
secure the  residence pending  receipt of the warrant. 
He stated:
[The officer] considered the fact that the arrest of 
Mr.  Pham on a Friday night at a busy ferry 
terminal, where someone who might have been 
meeting  up with Mr.  Pham or expecting 
Mr. Pham to arrive could have easily contacted 
the persons inside the residence.  Surveillance 
had indicated to [the officer] that two people 
were inside the residence and two people had 
left the residence at that point.  Because it was 
dark, it was not clear to the police whether the 
individuals inside the residence included [the 
accused]. 
... ... ...
[The officer] was of the view, based on all of the 
circumstances known to him at that point, that a 
large quantity of drugs was in the residence.  He 
believed that evidence could be easily destroyed 
by way of flushing those drugs down the toilet, 
incinerating them, or throwing  them away in 
some other manner. [R. v. Hunter, 2014 BCSC 
1492 at paras. 18-20]
The judge also found that the police had not created 
the exigency by arresting  Pham in front of witnesses 
at the ferry terminal. The warrant that was 
subsequently obtained was also found to have been 
properly issued. The accused was convicted of 
possessing  cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine 
for the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge  made severa l er rors , 
including  his findings that there 
were exigent circumstances and 
that the police had not created them. 
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Exigent Circumstances?
The accused argued that it was pure speculation by 
the police that there was a risk evidence would be 
destroyed. The police did not know who was in the 
house, whether the occupants had been made aware 
of Pham’s arrest, nor could they identify anyone who 
was aware of the arrest. Justice Willcock, speaking 
for the Court of Appeal, disagreed: 
That argument fails to take account of the 
substantial evidence leading  [the officer] to 
conclude the drug  operation involved numerous 
individuals (including the [accused], Windsor 
Nguyen and other Red Scorpions, of whom 
Mr. Pham was only one), and the evidence that 
the Strickland Street residence was being  used 
by that organization as a “stash house”. In these 
circumstances, in my view, it was not necessary 
for the police to identify a specific individual 
who might have observed or soon become 
aware of Mr. Pham’s arrest, or to determine who 
remained in the house, in order to have a well-
grounded belief that evidence might be 
destroyed if they did not act quickly to secure it. 
[para. 21]
Police Exigency?
The accused argued the police  could have delayed 
the arrest of Pham in order to obtain the search 
warrant before news of his arrest would have 
reached his associates. But it was the discovery of 
the cash in possession of Pham and its role in the 
decision to arrest the accused and search his 
residence that was key  to obtaining  the  warrant. 
Justice Willcock stated:
[T]here seems to me to be no basis for the 
argument that the police ought to have obtained 
a warrant to search the Strickland Street 
residence before arresting  Mr.  Pham. Further, 
that argument flies in the face of the [accused’s] 
fundamental argument that his arrest and the 
search of his residence can only be justified by 
reliance upon the evidence obtained as a result 
of the arrest and search of Mr. Pham. [para. 28]
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
submission that Pham’s arrest should have been 
effected in private so it would not have come to the 
attention of his associates:
Here, ... the police “were faced with an active, 
unfolding crime”. The arrest of Mr. Pham cannot 
be said to have been effected at a time and place 
of the police’s choosing. There is no suggestion 
that Mr.  Pham’s visit to the Strickland Street 
residence and his immediate departure from 
Vancouver Island was either anticipated or 
engineered by the police. His apparent plan to 
board the ferry was found by the trial judge to 
have forced the hand of the police. The 
conclusion that the police did not create the 
exigency is reliant upon findings of fact with 
which we ought not to interfere, including  the 
finding that [the officer] subjectively believed 
evidence would be destroyed and that there 
were objective grounds for that belief. [reference 
omitted, para. 30]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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R. v. Rompre, 2015 ONCA 707
After observing  a vehicle cross a stop 
line and proceed through an 
intersection on a  red light, a police 
officer pulled it over. The driver 
(accused)  began to get out but was 
ordered back in the car. As the officer approached 
the driver’s door he smelled a strong  aroma of fresh 
marijuana from about 12 feet away. He believed the 
smell was coming  from the car and observed the 
driver leaning  over the console when he was about 
10 feet away. When he reached the driver’s door he 
noted that the driver was very nervous. The driver 
produced his driver’s licence as requested. The 
officer leaned in the window and found the 
marihuana smell overwhelming. The driver removed 
his keys from the ignition and again tried to get out 
of the car. The officer called for backup  and the 
accused was arrested for possessing  the drug. He 
was placed in a police car and a small bag  of a 
green leafy  substance was found in the vehicle’s 
console. The officer smelled marijuana coming  from 
the back seat and, after pulling  down the back seat 
latch to gain access to the trunk, was overwhelmed 
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with the marijuana odour. A garbage bag  filled with 
over three kilograms of marijuana was found in the 
trunk along  with a bag  and a shoe box containing  a 
combined $71,150 in cash. A sergeant arrived to 
witness the findings go into property bags. The 
accused was arrested for possessing  a controlled 
substance for the purpose of trafficking  and he was 
taken to the police station. He was subsequently 
charged with possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking  and two counts of possessing  proceeds 
of crime. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The arresting  officer denied that he had 
pulled the accused over and stopped 
him without reason just to see what he 
might be able to find. His credibility  was 
questioned in cross-examination because he had 
been previously found guilty  of discreditable 
conduct three years earlier where  he admitted lying. 
He had called in to report that another police officer 
was sick and wouldn’t be able to attend court that 
day. The judge found that the officer was not 
forthright in his testimony about the  misconduct 
incident and expressed “serious doubt” about his 
testimony concerning  the traffic stop. The backup 
officer, however, also testified that he immediately 
“could smell” marijuana when he arrived on scene. 
He said the odour was “fresh”, reminded him of a 
grow op, and was a  very heavy smell when he got 
out of his vehicle. The backup officer also said that, 
in his experience, he had also seen drivers run red 
lights at that location.   
The accused argued that the Crown had failed to 
establish that the officer had reasonable grounds to 
stop his car. In his view, the officer was an 
“unmitigated liar” and his evidence should not be 
accepted. Since the stop was unlawful, the search of 
the car breached s. 8  of the Charter and the 
evidence ought to be excluded. The Crown, on the 
other hand, argued that the  onus was on the accused 
to establish a Charter breach on a balance of 
probabilities. The judge framed the issue this way:
If I were to accept on a balance of probabilities 
that [the arresting officer] had reasonable and 
probable grounds to conduct the traffic stop, 
then I would have to find the search of his motor 
vehicle was legal. If I were to find that I was not, 
on a balance of probabilities, able to accept that
[the arresting officer] had reasonable and 
probable grounds, then, I would have to find the 
search was illegal, and then consider whether 
the items seized must be excluded.
I am satisfied that while it is for the defendant to 
establish a Charter breach, it is for the Crown to 
establish on a balance of probabilities that [the 
arresting  officer] had reasonable and probable 
grounds to stop the defendant ..., before he 
conducted his search of the defendant’s car. This 
case is troubling because I must weigh the 
evidence of a police officer who is not only a 
proven liar, but lied at the preliminary inquiry, 
and was unresponsive in evidence before me. I 
remind myself that [the arresting officer] is a 
professionally trained witness who according to 
him has given evidence on countless occasions, 
but whose evidence had all of the hallmarks of 
either a liar, or someone who did not understand 
their obligations in the witness box.
While the professional misconduct findings in 
2009 are of concern, it was his evidence before 
me that I found troubling. He obfuscated, 
avoided the question, answered the question he 
wished had been asked, and generally was 
unresponsive. While the cross-examination was 
robust, it was respectful. I could see no reason 
for his virtual refusal to be forthcoming about the 
2009 incident. Needless to say his refusal to be 
forthcoming concerning  the 2009 incident, and 
not being truthful about his preliminary inquiry 
evidence which was very clear, raises serious 
questions concerning his evidence about the 
events leading up to the defendant’s traffic stop. 
To put it bluntly, how would I know when he is 
being candid and truthful, and when he is not? 
Ordinarily, in weighing the evidence of a 
witness, one can simply weigh the consistencies 
and inconsistencies internal to the evidence and 
balance it against other evidence. Here we have 
the unfortunate situation of a police witness who 
has created suspicion about the reliability of his 
own evidence through his own obfuscations and 
untruths. [paras. 17-19, 2014 ONSC 5600]
The judge then concluded that the backup officer, 
who was straight forward and believable, 
corroborated most of the  arresting  officer’s evidence 
which added weight to it. This corroboration 
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satisfied the judge, on a balance of probabilities, that 
the traffic  stop  was conducted after reasonable  and 
probable grounds had been established. The search 
of the vehicle was therefore lawful. The accused was 
convicted of possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking  and two counts of possessing  proceeds 
of crime. He was sentenced to nine months in jail, 
12 months probation and given a 10 year weapons 
prohibition. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
concluding  that the arresting 
officer;s testimony was confirmed 
by the backup officer. The Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed:
It was open to the trial judge to accept or reject 
the evidence of the arresting officer, with or 
without confirmatory evidence. The arrest arose 
out of a routine traffic stop and the evidence of 
the second officer on the scene confirmed much 
of the testimony of the arresting  officer. The 
second officer was not present when the 
[accused] was said to have ran the red light, but 
his testimony as to experience at the intersection 
where the stop occurred confirmed visibility 
issues and he confirmed other aspects of the 
arresting officer’s account as well. [para. 5]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Rompre, 2014 ONSC 5600
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Goodwin v. British Columbia 
(Superintendent of Motor Vehicles),
2015 SCC 46
Four separate  drivers received 90 day 
driving  prohibitions, had their 
vehicles impounded for 30 days and 
paid monetary penalties and fees 
under British Columbia’s Automatic 
Roadside Prohibition (ARP) law found in its Motor 
Vehicle Act. Three of the drivers provided a breath 
sample into an ASD and registered a “fail” while the 
fourth driver failed to provide an adequate breath 
sample.   
Superintendent’s Review
Al l four d r ive r s app l ied to the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles for a 
review of their driving  prohibitions. In 
each case, however, the Superintendent’s 
adjudicator dismissed the applications and 
confirmed the prohibitions. 
British Columbia Supreme Court (in Chambers)
The drivers then challenged the ARP 
scheme arguing  that it was ultra vires  the 
province. In their view, the ARP  regime 
was beyond the competence of the 
province to legislate, in effect, criminal law, a power 
reserved for the federal government. They also 
submitted that the ARP scheme violated ss. 8 (search 
and seizure), 10(b)  (right to counsel) and 11(d) 
(presumption of evidence) of the Charter. 
The judge, in chambers, found the ARP scheme was 
intra vires (within the legislative competence of) the 
province. He also found there was no s. 11(d) 
breach because the ARP scheme did not create an 
“offence” within the meaning  of the Charter and s. 
10(b) was saved by s. 1. However, he ruled that the 
ARP scheme breached s. 8 of the Charter when the 
screening  device registered a  “fail” reading, but not 
when a person refused. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The drivers appealed the Supreme 
Court judge’s ruling  arguing  that 
he erred in law by holding  that the 
ARP regime was valid provincial 
legislation, and by failing  to classify it as an 
“offence” or in finding  that it did not impose “true 
penal consequences”. The Superintendent cross 
appealed, contending  that the prohibitions, costs 
and penalties for an ASD reading  in the “fail” range 
did not violate s. 8 of the Charter  and, in any event, 
was saved by s.  1. All appeals were dismissed and 
the chambers judge’s decision was upheld.
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Supreme Court of Canada
The drivers launched a further 
appeal again suggesting  that the 
ARP scheme was exclusively 
within the federal government’s 
criminal law power and was 
therefore ultra vires the  provincial government. As 
well, the appeal addressed whether ss. 8 and 11(d) 
of the Charter were violated. Did the ARP regime 
create an “offence” for the purpose of s. 11(d)  and 
was the seizure  of a breath sample reasonable under 
s. 8?  
Provincial or Federal Jurisdiction?
The Constitution  Act, 1867, divides powers between 
the federal and provincial governments. The federal 
government exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the 
criminal law and procedure, while  each province 
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over property  and 
civil rights in the province. In determining  whether a 
law is a  valid exercise  of federal or provincial 
jurisdiction, the analysis considers (1)  what the 
“matter” - pith and substance - of the legislation is 
and (2)  whether the “matter” falls within a head of 
provincial power.
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the ARP 
scheme was nothing  more than crime control - a 
criminal law response to drunk driving  without 
engaging  the Charter and its procedural protections - 
dressed up as licensing.  Justice Karakatsanis, 
speaking on behalf of five other justices, wrote: 
I agree with the chambers judge that the 
Province’s purpose in enacting  the ARP scheme 
was not to oust the criminal law, but rather to 
prevent death and serious injury on public roads 
by removing drunk drivers and deterring 
impaired driving. The ARP scheme is part of the 
MVA, which establishes a regulatory regime 
setting  the terms and conditions of driver 
licensing in British Columbia. It continues British 
Columbia’s ongoing efforts to stem the tide of 
drunk-driving related incidents in the 
province. ... [B]oth the legislative history and the 
statutory scheme support finding that the ARP 
scheme was enacted to enhance highway safety. 
[para. 25]
And further:
At the end of the day, the purposes and effects of 
a law must be considered together, rather than in 
isolation, to determine its pith and substance.  
No doubt the ARP scheme has incidental 
impacts on criminal law. No doubt it targets, in 
part, specific criminal activity and imposes 
serious consequences, without the protections 
attendant on criminal investigations and 
prosecutions. However, the consequences relate 
to the regulation of driving privileges. In my 
view, the chambers judge was correct in 
characterizing  the pith and substance of the ARP 
scheme as “the licensing of drivers, the 
enhancement of highway traffic safety, and the 
deterrence of persons from driving  on highways 
when their ability is impaired by alcohol”. [para. 
29]
Having  identified the “matter” - pith and substance - 
of the legislation as the licensing  of drivers, the 
enhancement of traffic safety and the  deterrence of 
persons from driving  while impaired by alcohol, the 
majority went on to find that this was within the 
legis la t ive competence of the provincia l 
government. “Provinces thus have an important role 
in ensuring  highway safety, which includes 
regulating  who is able to drive and removing 
dangerous drivers from the roads,” said Justice 
Karakatsanis. “Provincial drunk-driving  programs 
and the criminal law will often be interrelated.”  In 
agreeing  with the chambers judge and finding  the 
matter fell within British Columbia’s provincial 
power over property and civil rights, she noted, 
“While the ARP scheme represents a more 
aggressive  approach by the  Province than the ADP 
scheme, it nonetheless retains its character.”
“The devastating consequences of impaired driving reverberate throughout Canadian 
society. Impaired driving renders roads unsafe, destroys lives, and imposes costs 
throughout the health care system.” (para. 1)
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Does ARP Create a s. 11(d) “Offence”?
Under s. 11(d) of the Charter, “Any person charged 
with an offence has the right...to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty according  to law in a 
fair and public hearing  by an independent and 
impartial tribunal.” The majority found that the ARP 
scheme did not create an “offence” within the 
meaning  of s. 11(d). It was not a criminal 
proceeding. It was not public in nature nor aimed to 
redress the wrong  done to society  by applying  the 
principles of retribution and denunciation in an 
open courtroom. Rather, the ARP regime was 
administrative. It regulated conduct within a limited 
private sphere of activity:  
The ARP scheme imposes a driving prohibition 
coupled with a monetary penalty.  It is not 
concerned with addressing  the harm done to 
society in a public forum; instead, its focus is on 
the regulation of drivers and licensing, and the 
maintenance of highway safety. Although it has a 
relationship with the criminal law, in the sense 
that it relies on Criminal Code seizure powers 
and is administered by police, the scheme is 
more accurately characterized as a proceeding 
of an administrative nature.  As the chambers 
judge noted, the proceedings arising under the 
ARP scheme do not take the form of 
prosecutions.  No criminal records result.  The 
proceedings are initiated by the drivers 
themselves. ...
Administrative regimes do not attract s. 11 
protections.  “This Court has often cautioned 
against the direct application of criminal justice 
standards in the administrative law area”. 
Nor are the consequences truly penal.  While a 
90-day suspension is a meaningful consequence 
for a licensing violation, and the approximately 
$4,000 in possible costs and penalties are 
significant, they are not sufficient to engage the 
fair-trial rights embodied by s. 11 ― rights that, 
after all, are some of the most fundamental in 
our legal system.  I note that financial penalties 
considerably more severe than those at issue 
here have been found to not constitute true 
penal consequences.
Whether such penalties amount to penal 
consequences must of course be assessed 
relative to the conduct in question and the 
regulatory objective.  The driving  prohibition 
relates directly to the regulatory terms and 
conditions under which a person may be 
licensed to drive.  Vehicle impoundment is 
directly related to the removal of drivers from the 
r o a d , a n d d r ive r s m ay a p p l y t o t h e 
Superintendent for review, including  on 
compassionate and economic hardship grounds.  
The remaining costs are tied to the various 
remedial programs, including installation of an 
ignition interlock device, and are incidental to 
the scheme’s objective of getting drivers and 
vehicles off the road.  Such costs can hardly be 
considered to be penal, particularly when 
viewed in light of the public interest in removing 
a drunk driver from a roadway once detected. ]
references omitted, paras. 43-46]
Since the ARP  scheme did not create an “offence” 
under s. 11 of the Charter, the protections of s. 11 
were not engaged.
ARP Scheme and s. 8 of the Charter?
A roadside breath demand constitutes a warrantless 
seizure under s. 8  of the Charter and therefore  it is 
presumptively unreasonable. However, a warrantless 
seizure will nonetheless be reasonable if it was 
authorized by law, the law itself was reasonable and 
the manner in which it was carried out was 
reasonable. 
Authorized by Law
The ARP scheme (s. 215.41(3)(a)  MVA) authorizes 
the seizure  of a roadside breath sample by relying 
on s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code. 
Is the Law Reasonable?
In deciding  whether a seizure of breath is reasonable 
under the ARP scheme, the Supreme Court of 
Canada reviewed its purpose and nature, the 
mechanism of seizure and availability  of judicial 
oversight (see grid). 
After examining  these four elements against the ARP 
testing  regime, Justice Karakatsanis concluded that 
the ARP scheme (as it was in 2010)  breached s. 8  of 
the Charter: 
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The ARP scheme as enacted in 2010 depends 
entirely on the results from a test conducted 
using  an ASD, a device known to produce false 
positives where mouth alcohol is present.  
Despite this defect regarding ASD reliability, the 
scheme provides no meaningful opportunity to 
challenge a licence suspension issued under this 
scheme on the basis that the result is unreliable.  
In the particular circumstances of these appeals, 
in which a “fail” result automatically triggers 
serious consequences for a driver without the 
possibility of review, the scheme fails to provide 
adequate safeguards.  Thus, despite the pressing 
objective and minimal intrusiveness of the 
seizure, the ARP scheme fails to strike a 
reasonable balance between the interests of the 
state against those of individual motorists, and 
infringes drivers’ s. 8 rights. [para. 77]
The majority then went on to hold that this scheme 
was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter.
A Different View
Chief Justice McLachlin, in dissent, 
agreed with the majority except for the 
issue about whether the ARP scheme 
breached s. 8  of the Charter. Using  an 
approach that examined (1)  the state objective, (2) 
the restraint of the incursion on the private interest to 
what was reasonably necessary to achieve  the 
object, and (3)  the availability of judicial 
supervision, she found no Charter violation. 
The appeals were dismissed
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s Note:  This case dealt exclusively with 
BC’s ARP regime in 2010. Since that time, 
amendments to the law in 2012 changed the 
scope of review for ARPs. The Superintendent 
now, on review, may determine the weight to be 
given to evidence, and must be satisfied that the 
driver was advised of the right to request a second 
analysis, that the second analysis was performed 
with a different ASD, that the prohibition was 
issued on the basis of the lower of the two results, 
and that the result of the ASD analysis was 
reliable. These amendments were not before the 
Supreme Court in this case. 
ARP Breath Sample Seizure Reasonableness Grid
Purpose of ARP Nature of ARP Mechanism of Seizure Judicial Oversight
• removing impaired 
drivers off the 
road
• preventing death 
and serious 
injuries on public 
highways
• ASD analysis 
identifies drivers 
over 50mg%
• suspend driving 
privileges
• ASD results 
determinative of 
consequences
• ASD test sole basis for 
penalties and 
suspensions
• although regulatory, 
has certain criminal-like 
features (eg. use of s. 
254(2) Criminal Code) 
• consequences are 
immediate and serious 
and do not require the 
use of a more reliable 
breathalyzer
• ASD is minimally 
intrusive
• more than demand for 
documents, but less 
than a blood sample or 
DNA swab
• concerns with reliability 
of ASD (eg. mouth 
alcohol)
• second sample only on 
request but no 
obligation to advise of 
this right
• second test governed 
regardless of whether it 
was higher or lower 
than initial test
• no meaningful way to 
challenge the basis 
for the ASD test nor 
its accuracy
• only two issues could 
be considered in a 
challenge to the 
Superintendent:
(1) whether the 
applicant was a 
“driver”
(2) whether the ASD 
registered a “fail, 
“warn” or the 
applicant refused 
“Administrative regimes do not attract 
s. 11 [Charter] protections.”
in 2010 ARP 
legislation
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... was the most 
common type of 
sentence imposed 
in adult criminal court cases, either by itself or in 
combination with other sentences. In 2013/2014 
probation was imposed in 43% of all guilty cases. 
Custody was imposed in 36% of cases while a fine 
was levied in 30%. The breakdown for when 
probation was imposed by the nature of the crime 
included:
• violent offences = 72%
• property offences = 58%
• administration of justice offences = 31%
• other Criminal Code offences = 49%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2013/2014”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on September 28, 2015. 
... was the most common type of offence completed 
in adult criminal court. In 2013/2014 there were 
38,635 impaired driving  offences. This was followed 
by theft (36,364), fail to comply with order (35,516), 
common assault (33,630), and breach of probation 
(31,334).
Of the above offences, breach of probation had the 
highest conviction rate  with 80% of adult cases 
resulting  in a guilty finding. Only 17% of probation 
cases were stayed or withdrawn, 2% resulted in an 
acquittal and 1% were classified as other outcomes, 
such as not criminally responsible or unfit to stand 
trial.  Impaired driving  was close second with a 78% 
conviction rate followed by fail to comply with order 
(68%), theft (61%) and common assault (47%). 
The most common offence stayed or withdrawn was 
prostitution at 73%. This was followed by attempted 
murder (65%), fail to appear and drug  possession 
(both at 53%) and possession of stolen property 
(50%. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2013/2014”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on September 28, 2015. 
The percentage of adults acquitted of 
criminal offences in Canada. Of the 
360,640 adult criminal cases in 
2013/2014, 13,979 resulted in an 
acquittal. This is a small number compared to the 
228,328 guilty verdicts (63%)  and the 114,525 
stayed or withdrawn cases (32%). The remaining 
3,808 offences, or 1%, resulted in other findings 
such as not criminally responsible, unfit to stand trial 
or special pleas. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 
2013/2014”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on September 28, 2015. 
... was the most frequently 
i m p o s e d s e n t e n c e i n 
administration of justice 
offences. In 2013/2014, 53% of cases involving 
administration of justice offences where there was a 
finding  of guilt resulted in a custodial sentence. In 
cases where there was not an administration of 
justice offence, custody was imposed only 22% of 
the time. 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Trends in offences against the administration 
of justice”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on October 15, 2015. 
Failure to comply with an order was the most 
common administration of justice charge in court, 
representing  50% of the charges. Breach of 
probation was second at 33%. The top five are:
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015, “Trends in offences against the administration 
of justice”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on October 15, 2015. 
FACTS - FIGURES - FOOTNOTES
Probation 4%
Impaired Driving
Custody
Failure to Comply
Charge Number (2013/14)
Fail to comply with order 164,612
Breach of probation 109,822
Other offences (eg. bribery, breach 
of trust, personating a peace officer)
23,837
Fail to appear 19,753
Unlawfully at large 10,500
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Wilson v. British Columbia 
(Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 
2014 BCCA 202
 
Wilson was stopped in a police road 
check. He had an odour of alcohol on 
his breath and admitted consuming 
four beers hours earlier. As a result of 
an ASD demand, he blew a WARN 
reading  (at least 50 mg%) into two different ASDs. 
Under s. 215.41 of British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle 
Act, the officer served Wilson with a Notice  of an 
Automatic Roadside Prohibition (ARP), also known 
as an immediate  roadside prohibition (IRP), for a 
period of three days.
 
Superintendent’s Review
 
Wilson applied to British Columbia’s 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles for a 
review of the prohibition. He argued the 
officer did not have  reasonable grounds 
to issue the ARP because there was no indication 
that his ability  to drive was affected by alcohol. In 
his view, the WARN reading  by itself was insufficient 
to uphold the prohibition. An adjudicator for the 
Superintendent, however, disagreed. In the 
adjudicator’s view, the  WARN reading  constituted 
the reasonable grounds for the officer’s belief that 
Wilson’s ability to drive was affected by alcohol.
 
British Columbia Supreme Court
 
Wilson sought judicial review of the 
adjudicator’s decision. He submitted that 
the legislation outlined in s. 215.41 
required more than a WARN result from 
an ASD before a driving  prohibition could be issued. 
In his view, other confirmatory evidence was needed 
to support the officer’s reasonable belief that a 
driver’s ability to drive was affected by alcohol.
 
The judge found that the language used in ARP 
legislation required more than a WARN reading 
before a driving  prohibition could be issued. In the 
judge’s opinion, an officer must have reasonable 
grounds to believe that a driver’s ability to drive is 
affected by alcohol in  addition  to the driver’s breath 
sample having  registered a WARN or FAIL. In other 
words, an ARP could not be issued strictly on the 
basis of a WARN reading  alone. “A plain reading  of 
the legislation requires more than just a WARN 
reading,” said the judge. “There is no presumption 
that a driver's ability to drive is affected by alcohol 
solely on the basis of a  WARN reading.” If the 
legislature intended the WARN reading  to be 
sufficient, the judge found it would have expressly 
said so in the  statute. Since there was no evidence 
that Wilson’s ability to drive was affected by alcohol, 
the notice of prohibition was quashed.
BY THE BOOK:
????	 Motor Vehicle Act? s. 215.41(3.1)
If, at any time or place on a 
highway or industrial road,
(a) a peace officer makes a 
demand to a driver under the 
Criminal Code to provide a sample 
of breath for analysis by means of an approved 
screening device and the approved screening 
device registers a warn or a fail, and
(b) the peace officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe, as a result of the analysis, that the 
driver’s ability to drive is affected by alcohol,
the peace officer, or another peace officer, 
must,
(c) if the driver holds a valid licence or permit 
issued under this Act, or a document issued in 
another jurisdiction that allows the driver to 
operate a motor vehicle, take possession of 
the driver’s licence, permit or document if the 
driver has it in his or her possession, and
(d) … serve on the driver a notice of driving 
prohibition.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles then appealed the 
judicial review decision quashing 
the  prohibition. The Court of 
Appeal found it was reasonable for the adjudicator 
to find a WARN result sufficient to provide 
reasonable grounds to trigger the driving 
prohibition.The adjudicator’s interpretation was 
reasonable, on the basis of the plain language of the 
text, the context of the section in the statutory 
scheme, and the purpose and objectives of s. 215.41
(3.1).
Supreme Court of Canada
A further appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Canada 
was unanimously dismissed. 
All seven justices hearing  the 
case found the adjudicator's 
interpretation to be reasonable when considering  the 
text, context and legislative objectives of the ARP 
scheme. 
Text
Justice Moldaver, speaking  for the  Supreme Court, 
found the plain meaning  of s. 215.41(3.1)  supported 
the interpretation that the  officer’s belief was linked 
to the results of the  ASD analysis. “The provision 
states that the peace officer must have reasonable 
grounds to believe, as a result of the analysis, that 
the driver’s ability to drive  is affected by  alcohol,” he 
said. “The wording  could not be clearer. The ASD 
analysis is the yardstick against which to measure 
the reasonableness of the officer’s belief.” 
There was no need for the officer to have 
confirmatory  evidence showing  the driver’s ability  to 
drive was affected by alcohol. However, if a driver 
blows a “warn” or “fail,” and the officer has reason 
to doubt the accuracy of the result (eg. reason to 
doubt the ASD device functioned properly or reason 
to doubt that the samples were taken properly), the 
officer must not issue a prohibition. On the other 
hand, if the officer has an honest belief in the 
accuracy of the ASD result then they will have 
reasonable grounds to believe, “as a result of the 
analysis”, that the driver’s ability to drive is affected 
by alcohol on a “warn” or “fail” reading. 
Context
The context of the provision is also consistent with 
the grounds on which the Superintendent may 
review a prohibition. Nowhere on review may the 
Superintendent revoke a prohibition if the officer 
does not point to other confirmatory evidence 
beyond an AD “warn” or “fail.” Nor does the ARP 
regime’s reliance on the  Criminal Code  demand for a 
roadside breath sample incorporate the same 
protections provided under the Criminal Code 
regime:
The MVA and the Code are two independent 
statutes, with two distinct purposes. They were 
enacted by two different levels of government, 
neither of which is subordinate to the other. 
Under the MVA, the demand for a breath sample 
triggers a regulatory regime that is wholly 
independent of the Criminal Code. The fact that 
the MVA relies on a Criminal Code demand for a 
breath sample does not render it subsidiary 
legislation.
In addition, it has long been recognized that 
regulatory legislation, such as the MVA, differs 
from criminal legislation in the way it balances 
individual liberties against the protection of the 
public. Under regulatory legislation, the public 
good often takes on greater weight. ...
“Impaired driving is a matter of grave public concern in Canada. Over the years, various 
Criminal Code offences have been enacted to deal with this problem. The provinces have 
also enacted regulatory legislation in an attempt to curb the number of impaired drivers 
on the road. Despite these measures, the problem of drunk driving persists, resulting as 
it often does in lives lost and lives shattered.”
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... Roadside driving prohibitions are a tool to 
promote public safety. As such, the legislation 
necessarily places greater weight on this goal. 
Unlike the criminal law regime, persons who 
register a “Warn” or “Fail” under the regulatory 
regime do not end up with a criminal record, 
nor are they exposed to the more onerous 
sanctions under the criminal law, including the 
risk of incarceration. In short, regulatory 
legislation does not share the same purpose as 
the criminal law, and it would be a mistake to 
interpret it as though it did. [references omitted, 
paras. 32-34]
Legislative Objective
The adjudicator's interpretation was also consistent 
with the legislative objectives of the ARP regime to 
improve highway safety and deter impaired driving:
Allowing  the police to rely on ASD test results is 
critical to the fulfilment of these objectives. ASD 
testing  provides an immediate, efficient tool for 
assessing whether an individual’s ability to drive 
is affected by alcohol. As the Court of Appeal 
noted..., scientific evidence shows that at 50 mg
% — the level needed to register a “Warn” — 
driving  skills are significantly impaired and the 
likelihood of being involved in a collision is 
markedly elevated. Evidence also shows that it is 
extremely difficult to identify drivers who have 
been drinking  by observation alone. These are 
the concerns that the ARP scheme is designed to 
address. It establishes a common standard for 
removing drivers from the road who pose an 
elevated risk to others. It also serves to deter 
drunk driving. [references omitted, para. 40]
As a result, a  peace officer may rely solely on an 
ASD result to form the requisite grounds to believe a 
driver’s ability to drive is affected by alcohol. 
Wilson’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
How the Supreme Court described BC’s ARP regime
“[The ARP regime] is dependent upon, and is only triggered by, a roadside demand for a breath sample made under s. 254 of the 
Criminal Code. Under the ARP scheme, when a driver registers a “Warn” or “Fail” on the ASD, the peace officer must issue a Notice, 
provided he or she has reasonable grounds to believe, as a result of the analysis, that the driver’s ability to drive is affected by alcohol. A 
driving prohibition must also be issued to individuals who fail or refuse to comply with a demand for a breath sample without reasonable 
excuse.
Drivers who blow a “Warn” — when the ASD registers a blood alcohol concentration of 50 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of 
blood (“50 mg%”) or higher — receive a Notice prohibiting them from driving for 3, 7, or 30 days, depending on their driving history. 
There is a corresponding fine of $200, $300, or $400, respectively. Drivers who blow a “Fail” — when the ASD registers a blood alcohol 
concentration of 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood (“80 mg%”) or higher — and drivers who refuse or fail to provide a 
breath sample receive a Notice prohibiting them from driving for 90 days and a $500 fine. Drivers who receive either a 30- or 90-day 
driving prohibition are subject to a mandatory 30-day vehicle impoundment.  At the peace officer’s discretion, drivers who are served with 
a 3- or 7-day driving prohibition may also have their vehicle impounded for the duration of their driving prohibition. Drivers may also be 
subjected to a variety of other consequences, including enrollment in a remedial program and the imposition of an ignition interlock 
device. Drivers are required to bear the costs of these programs, and must pay a fee to have their licence reinstated and their vehicle 
released if it has been impounded.
 An individual who has been issued a Notice may apply to the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles for review. However, the review is limited 
and the Superintendent may only revoke a Notice under certain grounds prescribed in s. 215.5 of the MVA. For an individual who has 
blown a “Warn” or “Fail”, the factors the Superintendent is to consider are:
• Whether the person was a “driver” within the statutory meaning;
•  Whether the person was advised of his or her right to a second ASD analysis and provided with a second analysis (if requested);
• Whether the second analysis, if requested, was performed with a different ASD machine;
• Whether the Notice was served on the basis of the lower of the two analysis results;
• Whether the ASD registered a “Warn” as a result of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration being at least 50 mg% or the ASD 
registered a “Fail” as a result of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration being at least 80 mg%;
• Whether the result of the analysis was reliable; and
• In the case of a 7-day prohibition, whether it was the driver’s second prohibition, and in the case of a 30-day prohibition, whether it 
was the driver’s third or subsequent prohibition.” - paras. 8-10, references omitted.
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R. v. Parchment, 2015 BCCA 417
The police executed a search warrant 
under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act at the accused’s home 
using  a battering  ram to knock in the 
front door. In the process, the accused 
was seen standing  in the kitchen. He picked 
something  up from the counter and threw it to the 
floor near the refrigerator while the officer forced 
him to the floor. On the floor under the refrigerator 
police found rock cocaine. The accused was arrested 
and asked if he had anything  on his person that the 
police “needed to worry  about.” He responded “I 
don’t think so.” The officer then conducted a pat-
down search, finding  an unsheathed hunting  knife 
with a four-inch blade wedged between two pairs of 
pants and fastened to the accused. An exacto knife 
was also located in the front pocket of his exterior 
pair of pants. When asked if he had anything  else 
that might cause concern to the police, the accused, 
after a  few seconds, said “No.” Eight other people 
found in the residence were moved to the living 
room, which was separated from the  kitchen by  a 
dividing wall.
The accused began to fidget or squirm while he was 
lying  on the kitchen floor. After consulting  with a 
supervisor, an officer conducted a further search. The 
accused was stood up, his exterior pair of pants was 
removed and, on a pat-down search, a hard object 
was detected in the accused’s groin area. Believing  it 
could be a knife, the officer looked down the loose-
fitting  inner pants. The accused had no underwear 
on and the  officer could see a baggie containing 
what appeared to be drugs attached to the accused’s 
penis by an elastic band. The officer then pulled the 
inner pants down to the accused’s knees, removed 
the baggie and he  was taken to the police station. 
The baggie  contained 18.9 grams of cocaine and 
22.4 grams of heroin. Scales, wrappers, and other 
indicia of drug  trafficking  were also found in the 
home along  with sheets indicating  payments in 
amounts and quantities indicative of drug trafficking.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge, treating  the search in this case 
as a strip  search, found the police  had 
reasonable grounds to conduct it in the 
field and that it was done reasonably. The 
judge accepted the police officer’s concern that the 
hard object he felt may have been a weapon and 
that the subsequent investigation was reasonable. 
The search was carried out in a private area and the 
other people present could not view the accused. 
The removal of the object was quick; the police 
simply  distended the elastic  band and removed the 
package. Any discomfort was “trifling” and the 
police were wearing  gloves. As well, they made 
notes about the strip  search and his race (being 
black) did not render the  search an unreasonable 
one. The evidence was admitted and the accused 
was convicted of possessing  cocaine and heroin for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the trial 
judge erred, among  other things, 
by admitting  the evidence found 
during  the search of his person. 
He argued that the judge improperly found that 
exigent circumstances existed to justify  both the field 
strip search and the ensuing  physical search (the 
seizure of the drugs). In his view, his s. 8  Charter 
rights had been breached and the evidence was 
inadmissible under s. 24(2). 
Exigent Circumstances 
In assessing  whether the strip search in the field was 
justified by exigent circumstances, the Court of 
Appeal noted the progression of the searches in this 
case:
Whether a field strip search was justified 
depends on the circumstances of the search. It is 
well established that the police have a right to 
“frisk” or “pat-down” a person arrested to 
determine if the person has weapons on his 
person. Having found weapons in that search 
and given the hesitation in answering whether 
he had anything else, the second pat-down 
search also was clearly within the allowable 
parameters.[para. 32] 
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In R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, the  Supreme Court of 
Canada observed that a strip  search will be justified 
“if the frisk search reveals a possible weapon 
secreted on the detainee’s person or if the particular 
circumstances of the case raise the risk that a 
weapon is concealed on the detainee’s person.” In 
this case, Justice Saunders, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, found the Crown had satisfied this concern:
The discovery of a hard object, combined with 
the knives found earlier on the pat-down 
searches, led to the police looking down [the 
accused’s] inner pants. There, not hidden by 
underpants, the officer saw the object attached 
to [the accused’s] person. Accepting  that this 
part of the events was a strip search because, as 
it turned out, [the accused] was not wearing 
underpants, I consider it was open to the judge 
to accept the police officer’s concern that the 
hard object that was felt may have been a 
weapon and to find in consequence that the 
subsequent investigation was reasonable. That 
finding brings the case within the statement from 
Golden that a strip search will be justified if the 
circumstances of the case raise the risk that a 
weapon is concealed. [para. 34]
Seizure of the Object
The accused objected to a number of aspects of the 
search, including  privacy, health and safety, the 
“field” nature of it, the  discomfort he experienced, 
lack of police notes and that his race was a  factor. 
But the Court of Appeal rejected each of these 
challenges and upheld the findings of the trial judge. 
Privacy: Even though the search took place in a 
space in the kitchen, it was a private area and the 
other people present could not see the accused. 
“Field” Nature of the Search: The police need not 
have transported the accused to the police station 
with the elastic  band and baggie still on him to have 
it removed by a medically trained person. “It defies 
credulity to consider the police should have left this 
elastic band and object on [the accused], given that 
it could be removed in a private area and that [the 
accused] had been fidgeting  with it on,” said Justice 
Saunders. The search was swift; the elastic band was 
stretched and the package removed. Any discomfort 
was, at most, minor and transitory. And the search 
would not have be any less intrusive or humiliating  if 
conducted at the police station.  
Health and Safety: The police officers were wearing 
gloves and may even have put latex gloves on. 
Notes: The police said they made notes at the scene 
and, while not marked as an exhibit, their existence 
was known and they were available for cross-
examination. Even so, the contemporaneous notes 
standard described in R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 for 
establishing  the legitimacy of a cell phone search 
incidental to arrest was not comparable to a search 
addressing  officer safety concerns. The search then 
only  deviated from that safety concern when the 
police discovered, instead of a weapon, what they 
thought was a drug packet. 
Race: The accused’s race (being  black) did not 
render the  search unreasonable. “The circumstances 
of the warranted entry into [the accused’s] residence 
and subsequent progressive  searches appear to me 
to be well within the parameters of proper 
investigative techniques in respect to any member of 
the community, and there is no suggestion on the 
record that racial considerations were applied to 
[the accused’s] detriment so as to otherwise give him 
cause for complaint as to the events,” said the Court 
of Appeal.
The trial judge made no errors in concluding  that the 
police actions were reasonable  and that there was 
no s. 8  Charter breach in the search incidental to the 
accused’s arrest. As such, there was no need to 
consider s. 24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“All successful people, men and women, are big 
dreamers. They imagine what their future could 
be, ideal in every respect, and they work every 
day toward their distant vision, that goal or 
purpose.” - Brian Tracy
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